That's certainly also true, at least for a large part of the pro-Palestinian supporters. Too few of them ever bother to put themselves in the shoes of an average Israeli, or of an Israeli political leader, and ask themselves what they would do in their position.

Agreed with the first part, not with the second. It's Hamas that you need the stick and carrots with. And Bibi proved his astonishing lack of anything resembling leadership or vision, yet again, when reacting so pettily to the formation of the Palestinian unity government, instead of seeing it as the big opportunity that it was. When have you ever known that man to take a real stand, do anything other than what public opinion seems to be telling him to do? Even Arafat was a better leader than that, and that's saying something.

I take it you read the conditions that Hamas required in exchange for stopping the missiles - they essentially merely amounted to a return to the status quo. After all, if you don't believe that Hamas' leadership ordered that kidnapping, which I at least haven't seen any proof of (it's likely that people with ties to Hamas were involved, but that is not the same thing), then it's really Bibi who initiated hostilities with the big crackdown and mass arrests. The retaliation murder didn't help, though at least he's smart enough to take that seriously.

Well, if some of your compatriots get their way, I dare say the West Bank would become another Gaza, another open-air prison. In which case, yes, it's hard to see much incentive for Hamas to remain peaceful.

But if an actually viable Palestinian state is allowed to exist, it could be a different story. Hamas is weaker than it used to be, both within Palestine and in terms of foreign allies, and I do think the years they have spent actually governing have led them to think more responsibly, as well. I'm certainly not saying that I expect them to become peaceful upstanding citizens just like that - there definitely needs to be a stick along with the carrot. But not this kind of stick, which is just a PR disaster even apart from the morality of the massive collateral damage. And also not the kind of stick that impedes the viability of the future Palestinian state by expanding settlements.

Since when does Israel do anything because of foreign popular opinion? Or do you mean domestic? In any case, I'm not sure I find the comparison that apt - the Palestinian case is rather uniquely complicated. And Hamas did in fact stop engaging in terror for the sake of terror, using those missiles merely in response to provocations from the other side such as that mass round of arrests, while keeping other groups from firing any, as well.

As for lifting the blockade - Israel can maintain strict inspections and controls to keep weapon imports to a minimum, without a full-scale blockade like now, and without keeping the Gazans from fishing in their own sea.

Which will achieve what, precisely? The best case scenario that I can see, from the IDF's perspective - at least assuming that this operation will refrain from becoming a long-term military occupation of the Gaza Strip, or attempting to overthrow Hamas - is that Hamas' significant progress in terms of the range of targets it can hit with missiles is reversed, and the range is reduced to what it used to be. That would be important, but on the other hand it would just be returning to the status quo of a few years ago, without any progress having been made on either side that I can see. In terms of getting Hamas to be more cooperative, which you suggest is the real goal, I can only say it looks extremely counterproductive to me.

As much as I despise Sisi, you're right that he offers an opportunity by weakening Hamas - but a diplomatic opportunity, not a military one. It's not as if having a friendly regime next door in Egypt was any really game-changing help to Hamas in military terms - it was much more important diplomatically. And then the Syrian situation weakens them further, by massively discrediting their allies in Iran and Hezbollah, and making it politically difficult for them to keep good ties with them.

A leader who was out to obtain peace - Rabin, say, maybe even Sharon - would have done something with that opportunity. Bibi just proves that Abba Eban's old line is as true for him as it ever was for Arafat - though I will admit that Arafats failure to grasp opportunities caused more damage to his people than Bibi's ever could. That is really part of the problem - in the short and even middle term, a peace agreement might cost Israel more than its benefits would justify, because it has already achieved by its own hand the main thing the Palestinians had to offer, near-guaranteed security for Israeli citizens (obviously I think that's a great achievement, even if I strongly disapprove of some of the methods used to reach it), while also grabbing more and more that it would have to give back.

I think that is really one of the main factors behind the "Boycott, Divest, Sanction" campaign - an attempt to create stronger incentives for Israel to reach a peace agreement. Not that I support that campaign - settlements should be boycotted as a matter of course, but nothing in Israel proper - but I do kind of understand it, looking at it that way.