A small part of it is, by the most common definition of Europe's borders, same goes for Azerbaijan - which puts both in a position similar to Turkey's. Does that make it a good idea for NATO to expand to Georgia, no - even aside from Russia's opinion, the disputed status of Abkhazia and South-Ossetia would make it a nightmare - but still it's enough that there wouldn't be geographical objections to its membership. Technically, by some definitions of the Europe-Asian border, even Kazakhstan has some territory inside Europe and at least in international sports, Kazakh football/soccer teams compete in Europe rather than Asia. But still the idea of Kazakhstan joining NATO or the EU would be a lot stranger to people - and for the other Central Asian states, I'm not sure it's ever come up or ever would.


As mentioned in the title, I agree in their two cases joining was primarily about the political benefits instead of the military ones - though since you're so eager to talk about coup attempts, I'm surprised you failed to mention the one Russian agents attempted in Montenegro to try and derail their accession to NATO. I have a feeling that the Montenegrins' love for Russia today is not what it was ten years ago anymore.

You'll have to forgive me for finding that a rather thin basis to base my belief on. I have certainly seen that Russia at the time found it reason enough to loudly complain about US support for Chechen terrorism, but that doesn't mean said complaints weren't bullshit. And Russia is still a gigantic hypocrite when it comes to separatism.

And yet Putin clearly thought he'd easily win the war against Ukraine and take Kyiv within a few months - nor did the West expect Ukraine to keep Russia out of this much territory for this long, either. But Ukraine being a threat to Russia or not, prior to Putin's invasion, wasn't so much a question of its relative military strength as a question of whether there was ever the slightest reason of expecting an Ukrainian invasion. China is doubtlessly stronger than Russia but there's zero reason to imagine they'd invade, so not a threat - nor was there any reason to imagine Ukraine doing so.

Yet still wouldn't have had any reasons to invade Russia. And the only reason why NATO would have invested such resources into it, would have been to defend against Russian aggression.

As you've noted elsewhere, before 2022 and even more so before 2014, the Europeans weren't exactly very enthusiastic about increasing their defense spending - and while the US is always keen to do so, the US really wanted and did try to make its much-discussed pivot to Asia, to spend its resources containing the new threat of China rather than the old one of the Soviet Union. If they partially stepped back from that and refocused more resources in Europe again, it's because Russia was threatening enough to make them do so.

I think you mean a more suicidal leader.

Because the Baltics and Poland are already in NATO. You're only proving the point of why it made sense for Ukraine to be so eager to join NATO here.





On the outcome of the war and the total lack of realism in Ukraine's war goals, we don't disagree nearly as much - though, as Greg pointed out, you are glossing over the similarly massive losses on the Russian side. As a percentage of the Russian population, not as devastating, true, but then the defending side in a war will inevitably have a lot more motivation and willingness for sacrifice than the invading side, as they have far more to lose if they stop fighting.