Gallipoli was a much younger and more foolhardy man, but I hope you're not going to advance the notion the Nazis "just got to Norway first" because I've seen a Norwegian factory where slave labor was forced to make Nazi munitions. The Allied invasion of Italy was a critical step; as bad as Normandy and the Bulge were, imagine how they would've been if the Wehrmacht hadn't lost the resources of Southern Europe (and the men and material lost in their failed defense. ) A lot of people forget about Anzio, but I'm not one of them; the defining image for me is a Bill Mauldin cartoon of a wide eyed dogface clinging to a vertical cliff above the caption "HIT THE DECK!" However, had the Nazis been able to concentrate their armies on the Russian front and patrolling the French coast D-Day might have been a very long day indeed.

Every quote from senior British AND German officials (in the same article) disputes that commentary Wikipedia appends to the actual quote they used there. Since effectiveness is very much the issue here (both of us having conceded the legitimacy of collateral damage) the "Effectiveness" section of the cited article might be instructive:

"Strategic bombing has been criticized on practical grounds because it does not always work predictably. The radical changes it forces on a targeted population can backfire, including the counterproductive result of freeing inessential labourers to fill worker shortages in war industries.[120]

"Much of the doubt about the effectiveness of the bomber war comes from the oft-stated fact that German industrial production increased throughout the war. While this is true, it fails to note production also increased in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, Canada and Australia. And, in all of those countries, the rate of production increased much more rapidly than in Germany. Until late in the war, industry had not been geared for war and German factory workers only worked a single shift (incredibly, German apprenticeships for aircraft electrical fitters still lasted four years at the wars end). Simply by going to three shifts, production could have been tripled with no change to the infrastructure. However, attacks on the infrastructure were taking place. The attacks on Germany's canals and railroads made transportation of materiel difficult.

"The attack on oil production, oil refineries and tank farms was, however, extremely successful and made a very large contribution to the general collapse of Germany in 1945. In the event, the bombing of oil facilities became Albert Speer's main concern; however, this occurred sufficiently late in the war that Germany would soon be defeated in any case. Nevertheless, it is fair to say the oil bombing campaign materially shortened the war, thereby saving many lives.

"German insiders credit the Allied bombing offensive with severely handicapping them. Speer repeatedly said (both during and after the war) it caused crucial production problems. Admiral Karl Dönitz, head of the U-Boat arm, noted in his memoirs that failure to get the revolutionary Type XXI U-boats (which could have completely altered the balance of power in the Battle of the Atlantic) into service was entirely the result of the bombing. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Europe), however, concluded the delays in deploying the new submarines cannot be attributed to air attack." (All emphases mine. )

Americas assessment differs from the German High Commands, but which do you think had the most insight into the feasibility of producing replacement and new units? Again, we're back to "does it pass the logic test?" and to say strategic bombing had negligible impact on production is belied by the fact Speer made a single aspect of strategic bombing top priority in the defense of Germany.

The rest of the section labeled "The British later in the war" covers your charges: Questions were raised about the overall effectiveness of strategic bombing and answered on the basis that strategic bombing was the most efficient use of limited resources. To conclude from this that the sole or even primary effect was on morale is illogical given that the only effect such bombing had on British morale was to stiffen resistance.

We know the bombing had a real and direct effect on production because the German High Command has stipulated it, so we're down to considering whether the great inaccuracy of bombing military targets was justified by the occasions it was successful. We seem to have a difference of opinion on that, which is fine, but to equate it with DELIBERATELY and INTENTIONALLY targeting civilians specifically is inaccurate, particularly when we have both agreed doing so is terrorism but unintentionally hitting civilians while striking military targets is not.

That the Germans wanted it so badly US airmen protected it with their lives, ensured its destruction if the plane went down, argues it was actually "quite good" rather than just "nothing better. "

According to your cited source and the senior Nazis cited THERE, it did that, but the damage to industrial infrastructure was greater, so that the overall effect on Nazi production was strongly negative.

There's a reason (other than being French) they could so easily force France to do that, despite the fact France had already said they'd declare war if Germany invaded Poland. As for Romanian "allies" yeah, the Nazis had lots of Southern European "allies" when a large veteran Wehrmacht was present and Nazi black ops teams were toppling sovereign governments; Austria was their "ally" (or rather, integrated member state) under those conditions, too. Whence did all this "pre-war materiel" originate if not Germany? You think they wanted the Saar back so they could ship coal and iron ore to Romania...?

I don't see how it could have been a crucial factor in their failure if strategic bombing is, as you portray it, a vast waste of limited resources that only strengthens the enemy. I was thinking more in terms of V-1s and V-2s (even if they weren't narrowly targeted at production) because they were largely unaffected by the British weapon (which the Nazis lacked) that turned the tide in the Battle of Britain: Radar. That the British detected incoming German bombers with radar and employed AA and fighter cover in conjunction with it makes comparisons to Allied strategic bombing very difficult.

I believe this was addressed at the Wikipedia article on WWII strategic bombing you referenced earlier, that it further shows a public debate in Britain and, most importantly, that without the effects on production it never would have continued. The authorities tasked with stating the case for and against both cite production effects repeatedly in their statements, as in this instance from the case against: "Mr. Justice Singleton, a High Court Judge, was asked by Cabinet to look into the competing points of view. In his report, delivered on 20 May 1942, he concluded, 'If Russia can hold Germany on land I doubt whether Germany will stand 12 or 18 months’ continuous, intensified and increased bombing, affecting, as it must, her war production, her power of resistance, her industries and her will to resist (by which I mean morale)'.[113][114][115] " (Emphases again mine. )

Note that morale is mentioned--last, and in the company of three other factors all related to production.

I dunno, a lot of US servicemen hopped into cockpits to go fight Japanese and Nazi aces knowing that the latter had better aircraft and more experience, but they went anyway. Until the introduction of the Mustang Axis aircraft consistently outperformed Allied ones in flight ceiling, air speed and maneuverability, but American fighters prevailed because there were SO MANY of them (much like an aerial version of a First War "human wave" ) and could keep flying even when they'd had the crap pounded out of them. There's definitely something to be said for "bloody but unbowed" and it got the Allies through the first half of the war.

That the Nazis diverted significant resources to stopping the strategic bombing campaign, despite their general disregard for public welfare, DOES, in fact, argue a great deal regarding the actual cause (or at least immediacy) of defeat. As do repeated statements of exactly that by senior German leaders Speer and Donitz (the man in nominally in charge of Germany after Hitlers suicide. ) Slaughterhouse Five, btw.

No, I don't, for various reasons that could fill a thread of its own, but to imply strategic bombings extreme collateral damage turned the Nazis into genocidal monsters ignores historical fact. Valid or not ( "not" IMHO) I recommend keeping it to yourself the next time you visit Germany. I still recall from HS German class in the mid-nineties hearing about a German PM who, in a patriotic fervor inspired by the end of the Wall, spontaneously opened a Parliament meeting with the nationalistic (and banned) first verse of Duestchland Uber Alles; his colleagues forced his resignation the following day.

I never forget the von Ribbentrop treaty; it was a race to see who'd backstab the other first. I doubt Poland's forgotten that the first Soviet armies arrived, not in '43 as liberators, but in '39 as conquerors. But I can't believe even Chamberlain would be naive enough to think, Well, we aren't accurate enough to hit the factors reliably; let's see if we can't just hit enough homes to depopulate the entire workforce. Hitler outfoxed them because of a persistent and pernicious European aversion to war above all else, a neurotic legacy of the First War, but not in itself an indictment of intellect.

If credible, yes, but I don't think it is.

The deathcamps weren't just sitting their feeding people into meat grinders; Prescott Bush, for example, had substantial shares in a factory right next to Auschwitz that used the deathcamps slave labor to produce a great deal of Nazi material (the profits were ultimately seized under the Trading with the Enemy Act. ) That's not to say the Allies didn't have a large industrial advantage; there's a reason the Nazis resorted to slave labor on a large scale (e.g. Norway. ) But once the Allies accepted that the game was afoot they overcame their learning curve pretty quickly, and to say they won SOLELY because of greater numbers and production is inaccurate.
Except we were not exactly doing anything evil. Our sins there were sins of omission in carrying out justice, and explained away by national security interests.
Perhaps, but not the point; to say we "dehumanized" the Germans as a whole and refused to even speak to them is factually incorrect, and you know it. It's a nice piece of rhetoric if no one knows any better, but that's all it is.

I don't doubt you care about "us" but you HAVE been known to identify with Germany, if not to the same degree as with America, and I admit I'm a little sensitive to such things; the need (not that I've seen you indulge this aspect) to append things to "-American" conveys to me the sense that "American" isn't good enough. I strongly disagree with the rest of your statement; debaathifying Iraq has gone NOTHING like denazifying Germany, partly because we don't have the national resolve and partly because we don't have a million or so draftees to police the streets. Occupied Germany had military checkpoints at nearly every major intersection, and civilians on the street (who were substantially harder to distinguish from Allied personnel on sight) needed signed and up to date passes not only to be outside but to be IN THAT PARTICULAR AREA or they were subject to arrest and detention. Compare that to Iraq, where, if things get bad enough, they'll institute a night curfew for selected areas. It's a whole other animal, but then, at the height of the Cold War US troops alone in Germany were about a quarter million people, while the Bush administration fired a Chairman of the Joint Chiefs for telling Congress it would take a minimum of 200,000 boots on the ground to do it in Iraq.

Deathcamps in Europe seem perfectly likely to me, because I remember whose military had to lead the effort to shut them down in Bosnia fifteen years ago (hint: Not a European military. ) But I admit our hands aren't clean; as I noted above, we let not just Germans, but active NAZIS walk free after the war because it suited our purposes. I personally think we paid a great penalty for that crime, because senior members of Hitlers secret police virtually created the CIA under the leadership of Wild Bill Donovan (and in direct disobedience to a Presidential order no proven Nazis could be allowed to escape. ) Isn't it odd that it was around that time America began the practice of covert teams toppling elected governments and assassinating or allowing the assassination of heads of state just like the Nazis? That the President who fired the first DCI got a bullet in his head under circumstances that remain highly suspicious to this very day? Of course, the commission of which said fired DCI was a member said Oswald did it alone, so that's the end of it....

I don't excuse my goverments unethical, even immoral acts, but I also don't see that government as the fount of all evil because of them either. It consists of humans at least as flawed as any others, and that makes it fully capable of doing awful things that demand correction. I do not believe strategic bombing, let alone entry to WWII, to be among them.

I grant he probably needs to be committed. I believe he was very much committed to receiving a paycheck while ignoring real problems though, that's why he ignored three separate pieces of intelligence of which anyone should've tipped him to 911, why his own former Treasury Secy. claims the President-Unelect was planning an Iraq invasion before he ever took office and why, after the 911 attack by Afghan sponsored terrorists, we invaded Iraq. He was committed to winning his family feud and collecting >$400,000/year; beyond that, whether you're bin Laden or a New Orleans resident, his commitment tapered off quickly. How's his Constitutional Amendment to ban gay marriage doing...?