Wikipedias example illustrates that: Fifty voters rank a right, center and left candidate. Thirty right voters rank them R-2, C-1, L-0. Twenty center left voters rank them C-2, L-1, R-0. The final tally is C-70, R-60, L-20. The center candidate wins despite a right majority, and despite the fact the right candidate would win a two candidate race against either of the others, so Borda isn't Condorcet complete either.

Further, tactical voting could (and, I suspect, often would) make a consensus second choice NO ONE chose first defeat a majority first choice. A simple example would be 50 people choosing 4 candidates. Thirty right voters rank them FR-4, CR-3, CL-2, FL-1. Twenty left voters vote tactically and rank them FL-4, CR-3, CL-2, FR-1. The final tally is FR-140, CR-150, CL-100, FL-110. The center right candidate wins despite a far right majority, and even though the far right candidate would win a two candidate election against any other, so once again, not Condorcet complete. If the minority doesn't vote tactically, the result is the same as an ideal FPtP system. Ironically, tactical FPtP voting means America already elects the least objectionable candidate in practice, so the only difference I see is that Borda is designed to produce PTtPs accidental result, and wouldn't really change much in the US.

In this list, monotonicity is the only thing I want that Borda has and Instant Runoff doesn't, but I prefer the IR guarantee of a majority and mutual majority winner Borda lacks. Without a mutual majority guarantee minorities voting the party to prevent the other side winning can reduce elections to moderate and far minority candidates (not that that ever happens in the US. ) I realize chances a system WILL violate a criterion if it CAN are debateable, but that could go around in circles all day so I'm not going there.