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I'm glad you like them. Then you should also like The Zimmerman Telegram and A Distant Mirror. Legolas Send a noteboard - 06/09/2012 08:24:06 PM
The latter is an entirely different period of history, looking at 14th century Europe, largely through the perspective of a high French nobleman, Enguerrand de Coucy, who had ties to many European royalties and was involved in a lot of the events of the century.

It's funny, thinking about that, how little had changed between the battle of Nicopolis in 1396, when incompetent leadership and criminally skewed priorities on the "Crusader" side contributed to a devastating defeat against the Osmans, and the attitudes of WW1 commanders that you described below.
198 years ago today, the Battle of the Marne was raging. When it ended a few days later, the Germans were forced to withdraw from their advance positions near Paris and the Western Front of World War I ceased to be a war of maneuver. An almost unbroken line of trenches would stretch from the Belgian coast to the Swiss border and, despite the tragic and colossal waste of some of the best and brightest talents of Europe, running into the millions, no serious territorial gains would be made by either side until 1918.

What pisses me off the most about WW1 and the military leadership there, is this: the Western Front wasn't moving. Everybody knew that the Western Front wasn't moving and was completely deadlocked. But there was a whole lot of movement elsewhere - by the time the American tanks finally did bring movement to the Western Front, the British had forced the issue in the East and the end was coming for the Central Powers one way or another. So why did they keep feeding lives into that maw of destruction that was the Western Front in completely futile attacks, instead of deploying their soldiers in places where they could actually make a difference? Not that the slaughter in the Eastern Front, Italian Front and elsewhere wasn't equally horrific in scale - Austria-Hungary lost insane amounts of men too, without ever fighting on the Western Front, and Russia still more. But at least there they were fighting for a reason.
However, I personally enjoyed the former of the two books, which she wrote after The Guns of August. Both books are written with a narrative style that is fresh and dynamic. As history books, in which the author must fight against a too literal recitation of facts (or, alternatively, too much editorializing and personal opinion), go, Tuchman's are some of the best. I rank her on a par with Massie or Wedgwood in the art of narrative history. The personalities are vividly described, the actions and consequences are felt with a sense of immediacy.

Agreed, I really like her. Haven't read those others you mention, I probably should. :P
When reading The Guns of August, the sheer madness of the First World War is shown in stark relief. It was a war that no one needed, fought by governments that were criminally reckless in their lack of preparedness and incompetence in execution of the war, and led to such a wholesale slaughter without any regard for protecting the lives of the soldiers called to fight in it that even the most martial reader will be disgusted beyond belief. In short, the war was a textbook for why not to fight and how not to fight.

Indeed. Not that that was new... I read Orlando Figes' book on the Crimean War not long ago, and there too the military incompetence beggars belief at times.

I guess it had a lot to do with people thinking it would be a war like the previous wars - the Franco-Prussian, Austro-Prussian and Danish-Prussian Wars, or the Italian fight for unification - in which a short (though possibly bloody) campaign would lead to negotiations and some negotiated result, in which more often than not the conquering armies would withdraw and give up the territories they had temporarily held, or at least most of them. Without thinking about how technology had changed, and how a war without a clearly superior side could rapidly result in losses so staggering that a rapid armistice and negotiated peace became very difficult. They should have heeded the warnings of the Crimean War instead.

In hindsight, one could make a valid case that Europe would have been a lot better off if the British *had* stayed out of it and left the Germans on their own, or if despite the combined efforts of British and French as described in The Guns of August, the Germans *had* taken Paris one month into the war, like the last time. And I say that as a Belgian. Although I guess you could say that in that case, it would only have been a matter of time before the next war, which might have been equally bloody as WW1 the way it did happen.
Tuchman highlights the collective madness that seized the governments of Europe at the time, paying special attention to all of the instances when individuals had it in their power to stop one aspect of the war or another, yet stood idle or resigned themselves to let the series of events play themselves out without making any effort to alter their course. Based on a reading of Tuchman, no one can come away with an impression other than that it was the German Kaiser (whom Tuchman alternately refers to, in the same book, as "William" and Wilhelm in various spots without any discernible reason, which irritated me personally) who forced the war. The French wanted to avoid it, the English wanted to avoid it, the Russians should have wanted to avoid it, and the Austrians would have probably agreed to Serbia's terms if not for the Kaiser.

I don't think you can absolve the French in particular from all blame. They too wanted their revenge for the Prussian War. Der Kaiser was a complicated man, not so easily pinned down, as far as I can tell - sabotaging his own government half of the time, like in that Agadir episode that surely is mentioned in one or both of the books. I'm sure you're right about him escalating the Franz Ferdinand incident, though.
However, once the dirty business started, the decisions of the armies were so revolting that I was indignant that more of the generals were not drawn and quartered. Sukhomlinov of Russia didn't see the need for more arms or ammunition factories, or really, any sort of planning. The Russians used open wireless signals for military messages, which let the Germans know exactly where they were and what they were doing. The French army insisted on wearing bright red pants because they "looked better", and their entire strategy revolved around attacking with inferior numbers because they had a better "fighting spirit". The British cavalry commanders argued that sabers were better than rifles (the first enemy machinegun positions corrected this error), and Sir John French wanted to cut and run with the entire BEF, abandoning France to the Germans. The French didn't believe in heavy artillery and had nothing heavier than 75mm guns. The Germans thought that burning villages in Belgium (including Louvain with its priceless library) and slaughtering civilians would somehow suppress partisan attacks. All sides thought the war would be over by Christmas 1914.

Agreed, though as I said above, the thing pissing me off most of all is simply the strategic decisions of the British and Germans of where to deploy the mass of their troops (the French didn't really have that many choices, I guess) - and their refusal to keep things passive on that Western Front. Time was ticking in the Allies' advantage, at least from a certain point onwards - those offensives were just so pointless.
Reading the casualties for each day, seeing the tens of thousands of dead and hearing about the piles of corpses in just the first days, I was shocked that it would or could continue as it did. France was losing more people each week (and in some cases, in one day) than the US has lost in all its wars of the Twenty First Century combined. When it was over, 1 in 28 Frenchmen were dead, a higher ratio of dead to total population than any other belligerent nation and a factor in France's swift defeat of 1940. However, Germany didn't fare much better, with a loss ratio of 1 to 32 per capita.

Serbia/Yugoslavia beats them all, I think, but yes, the French losses were insane. As I've argued before in other threads, there is only one instance in American history that is remotely comparable to the European losses in WW1 (and, for Germany and Russia at least, WW2), and that is the South in the Civil War, but nobody cares about them since they had slaves and they lost. Perhaps if the South had been the winning side, Americans would have an easier time understanding how the Europeans turned so pacifist under the influence of WW1 (and, again, WW2 in some countries).
Both books are well worth the read. There is plenty of material for people who enjoy all sorts of history, and they are also the sort of history books that are likely to appeal to the reader who rarely if ever reads history.

I agree.
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Barbara Tuchman: The Proud Tower and The Guns of August - 06/09/2012 07:18:57 PM 901 Views
Those sound good. - 06/09/2012 07:52:29 PM 764 Views
You should also consider Veronica Wedgwood. - 06/09/2012 08:23:57 PM 558 Views
198 years ago? *NM* - 06/09/2012 08:00:56 PM 425 Views
I'm glad you like them. Then you should also like The Zimmerman Telegram and A Distant Mirror. - 06/09/2012 08:24:06 PM 765 Views
If I can find them in hardcover I just might - 07/09/2012 12:00:58 AM 580 Views

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